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Abstract: 
 
Recent years have seen international political economy (IPE) become an 
increasingly bifurcated field of inquiry.  On the one hand deductive, rational 
choice driven analysis has taken IPE increasingly in the direction of economic 
analysis toute courte.  This has especially been the case in the United States.  
On the other hand, driven more by the largely inductive tradition in the non-
economic social sciences, IPE, especially in a European and ‘southern’ context 
has become more, indeed as some would argue excessively, ‘reflexive’ in 
direction.  One approach asserts its social scientific status while the other asserts 
its normative imperatives.  This bifurcation is undesirable and, this paper 
argues, unsustainable in the contemporary ea.  The need to understand and 
explain globalisation should, in both theory and practice, make this bifurcation 
redundant. Fortunately there are elements of an evolving IPE that is increasingly 
historically and empirically grounded, analytically sophisticated and in search 
of tighter, less indulgent, more policy relevant, normative purchase on key 
issues of IPE such as justice, equality and development.  It is doing this by 
paying close attention to work on these issues by normative political 
philosophers. Similarly, political philosophers are recognising the need to come 
to terms with the research agendas of IPE.  This coming together is not an easy 
process.  Indeed it is in its formative stages.  But it is an important scholarly 
project, and one which should cast larger policy shadows over the global order, 
which is likely to gather momentum over the next few years. 
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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (IPE) AND THE 
DEMAND FOR POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AN ERA OF 
GLOBALISATION1 
 
Introduction 
For many years International Political Economy (hereafter IPE) was 
something of a misfit in the study of international politics in particular and 
political science; indeed in the social sciences in general.  It was never at 
ease with the economist, for whom it was not ‘real economics’; far too 
‘economistic’ for scholars of international relations; too ‘international’ for 
scholars of political science and largely un-noticed by normative political 
philosophy.  As a consequence, it tended to sit at the periphery of most social 
science ‘disciplines’.  For a range of reasons to be discussed in this 
companion essay to political philosophy, this situation has changed 
dramatically over the last 2 decades.  IPE is now deemed more salient to the 
study of politics and international relations and even some branches of 
economics.  Pertinently, the interactions between IPE and philosophy are 
becoming similarly important of late. 
 
The essay provides a synoptic analysis of international political economy with 
backwards and forwards linkages between it and contemporary political 
philosophy   I have taken my steer for the structure of this chapter from the 
editors.  The chapter does two 2 things:   First, it provides a ‘practical guide to 
someone who wants to find their way through the relevant field’.  To this end 
the essay is addressed not at the specialist of IPE. Rather it is embedded 
within the context of the social sciences and especially economics and 
political science. Second, political philosophy is read as political ‘theory’ 
broadly defined but with a specific interest in ‘normative thinking’. (Goodin and 
Pettit, 1995: 1)  
 
IPE should be understood as both a field of inquiry and a substantive issue 
area in the study of international relations (hereafter IR).  Whilst it is not a sub 
                                                 
1 A revision of this paper will appear in Robert Goodin, Phillip Pettit and Thomas Pogge (eds.) A 
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwells, 2007, 2nd Edition.  This is a 
first draft. Comments welcome to richard.higgott@warwick.ac.uk. 
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branch of international relations, its most recent instigating discipline, 
somewhat limitingly, has been IR and the re-discovery of the relationship 
between IR and international economics in the last quarter of the 20th century.   
IPE of course draws from the historical evolution of political economy 
(Caporaso and Davis, 1992; Watson, 2005) but the recent growth of IPE 
throughout the latter stages of the 20th century has been underwritten largely 
by economics of the neo-classical variety more than the more historicist 
political economy approaches from whence it originally came.  This is much 
more so the case within a North American context where, unlike its European 
counterpart, IPE tends to place less emphasis on the need to see economic 
activity embedded in social, political and historical contexts and especially the 
social bonds that developed between the market and the state in the 20th 
century European system. 
 
IPE’s strength, in both theory and practice and across the field, is that it 
eschews the analytical separations that have pertained between the study of 
economics and politics (and, ipso facto IR) throughout the 20th century.  It also 
resists the notion of discrete national economies within the international (or 
‘global’ economy).  But without understanding how economics and the other 
social sciences were drawn apart in the past, we cannot see why IPE has 
been important as an analytical exercise to bring them together under 
conditions of globalization.  If all we now knew of the world was its material 
conditions under globalization, it would seem odd to recent student of IR that 
these disciplines were ever separated. IPE's analytical salience has grown as 
globalization has become an increasingly important phenomenon over the late 
20th and early 21st centuries (Higgott, 1999).   
 
Section one of the essay identifies the different modes of thinking (it is hard to 
call them schools of thought) that inhabit the world of IPE.  Section two offers 
an explanation of the development of IPE.  This, in turn, is done in a twofold 
manner.  Firstly, it focuses on the linkages between globalization as practice 
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and process on the one hand and IPE as explanation and analysis on the 
other. Using policy focussed lenses it identifies the substance of IPE that 
emerges from the growing salience of interdependence and globalization in 
the last quarter of the 20th century.  Second, it provides a brief intellectual 
history of IPE to show it as an epistemologically and methodologically 
contested area of inquiry within which the principal demarcation line is 
between a deductive rationalist tradition, dominant in North American 
scholarship on the one hand, and an essentially inductive mode of reasoning 
that prevails in many non-North American scholarly communities (in both 
Europe and the southern hemisphere on the other.  Within IPE, subject 
matter—the relationship between the economic and political and the domestic 
and the international—is less the issue of disagreement than the appropriate 
theoretical perspectives to be employed. 
 
Section three identifies the core policy issues that IPE will have to address in 
the early third millennium: especially 'how do we govern the global economy 
under conditions of globalization and, more importantly, how we do so in an 
ethical, responsible, accountable and just fashion?’  The relationship between 
globalization and governance is what will lodge IPE at the centre of the study 
of world politics and economics in the 21st century.  Questions about this 
relationship are not merely technical-cum-practical and policy focussed.  They 
are highly charged normative questions.  It is here that the relationship 
between IPE and political philosophy as normative political theory is becoming 
increasingly salient.   It is the relationship that makes IPE important to a 
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy.  It is, or should be, as 
important to the normative theorist as it is to the scholar of IPE. 
 
(1) Contemporary Approaches to IPE—A Brief Introduction 
In the late 1960s and 1970s, scholars of IR in the United States began to 
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focus on the growing importance of transnational economic relations and the 
consolidation of interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1970 and 1977).  In 
Europe, Susan Strange (1970) identified the serious mutual neglect that 
existed between international economics and international relations.   But it is 
not always clear what is meant by IPE.  It is a contested field of inquiry as can 
be seen from a comparison of its two main journals—International 
Organisation, reflecting the heavily rationalist focus of North American 
scholarship and the much more pluralist/eclectic Review of International 
Political Economy that reflects the stronger radical and constructivist 
intellectual enterprises of the European scholarly community.  The only real 
focus of agreement across contested views is in the need to end the 
separation of analysis of economics and politics and between the domestic 
and international political economy.   
 
The broad divide to be found amongst analysts is between those who see IPE 
as the objective application of economic principles to international issues and 
those scholars who see IPE as a more interpretative, historical and structural 
way of thinking about the global economic order.  For the former group 
objective reality exists.  For the latter group reality is inter-subjective.  In this 
regard, the first group expresses a rationalist outlook while the latter is what is 
now called a "reflectivist" and/or "constructivist" outlook.  For some scholars 
these two approaches, reflecting incommensurable epistemologies are 
irreconcilable (Hollis and Smith, 1991  For others, increasingly in the USA but 
also amongst some European and Asian scholars, constructivism represents 
a critique and refinement of the limits of rationalism (see Katzenstein, 
Keohane and Krasner, 1998 and Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). 
 
Rationalists draw on the tradition of economics, especially the maximisation of 
choice under conditions of scarcity.  They rely on an assumption of 
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instrumental rationality in the identification of the behaviour of actors.  
Rationalists privilege shared knowledge and (often imperfect) information, 
identifiable actor preferences, and strategic thinking.  These factors come 
together in the importance rationalists place on game theory as a way of 
determining actor behaviour.  If, it is argued, we understand actor preferences 
then we can determine strategies and subsequent policy outcomes.   
 
Constructivists on the other hand stress the inter-subjective nature of 
knowledge, without which the world has no material meaning.  They are 
concerned with how the existence of multiple identities constrains an objective 
understanding of reality from which rationalists think economic models can be 
drawn in non problematic fashion.  Constructivists privilege the 'constitutive' 
characteristics of knowledge, identities and norms which define not only how 
socio-political actors behave towards each other but also, more deeply, the 
sources of the identity of these very actors (see Wendt, 1999).  Within the 
context of this broad divide, IPE reflects the range of general theoretical 
orientations and causal relations to be found in the other areas of the study of 
international relations--realist, liberal, Marxist and the like.   
 
In their causal explanations, realists privilege the centrality of the state and the 
use of coercion and power; liberals privilege negotiation, contractual 
obligations and the development of regimes; Marxists privilege the role of 
material and ideological exploitation. Realists and liberals disagree less about 
assumptions over how actors, especially states, will behave and more about 
what are the international problem areas in need of resolution; that is, what 
are the aims and aspirations of states?  Realists assume states are interested 
in securing benefits and gains in superior quantities to their international 
competitors (relative gains).  These are secured in distributional conflicts in 
which power is the salient variable (Greico, 1998).  Liberals assume that 
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states are primarily interested in minimising market failure and securing 
overall welfare improvement (absolute gains).  While not denying elements of 
the realist position, liberals see a much stronger role for agreed institutional 
arrangements (regimes) that will leave all players better off (Keohane, 1989). 
 
We can also identify what we might call a turn to ‘critical theory’ in IPE which, 
in part emanated from the harnessing of European continental philosophy to 
IPE.  This work is complex and multifaceted and much more structuralist in 
orientation.  Critical theory should be seen as a short hand reflection of 
alternatives to mainstream (neo) realist, and (neo) liberal approaches.  Some 
see critical theory at the ‘margins of the discipline of international relations 
(Weber, 2002).  I see it more closely as a reflection of the distinction between 
the dominance of a realist-liberal paradigmatic spread in a north American 
context and a more pluralist approach reflecting elements of Marxism 
(orthodox and Gramscian) and, albeit to a lesser extent, critical theory of the 
Frankfurt variety.  It differs from the structuralism of say Susan Strange in its 
transformationalist normative agenda. 
The major contribution to critical theory is to be found in the writings of the 
early dependency theorists (Prebisch 1959; Cardoso and Falleto (1979), 
World Systems Theorists (Wallerstein, 1979) and later Marxists such as 
Robert Cox, (1987) and Stephen Gill (1993 and 2002).  Rather than see IPE 
as but a sub-discipline of international relations (the common position within 
the wider IR community throughout most of the second half of the twentieth 
century) they see IPE as that larger set of material structures that determine 
world order.  International relations (relations between states) are but part of 
these structures.  Across the spectrum, political and economic outcomes are 
determined by the organization of capitalism.   
 
This structuralist position contrasts sharply with the dominant tradition in IPE 
in the USA which grew out of the identification of international 
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interdependence and trans national relations in the 1970s. (Keohane and 
Nye, 1977)  The importance of this was as much its identification of IPE as a 
field of study as any serious theoretical advance.  It was still very much 'state 
to state' style international relations and did not make the connections with the 
domestic political economy in the way that Marxists claimed to do.  Indeed, 
the importance of Marxist analysis was the manner in which it concentrated on 
the determinants of foreign economic policy such as the interests of 
multinational corporations and the role of social forces and political 
institutions.   
 
It was only towards the closing stages of the 20th century that mainstream 
analytical insight in the US, as its key figures are now willing to concede 
(Katzenstein et al.,1998: 648 and Keohane and Milner, 1996), began to take 
these linkages seriously.  The conversion arose from a change in intellectual 
thinking--principally a modest recognition of the limits of rationalism and the 
importance, in their different ways, of institutionalist and sociological 
perspectives.  With their emphasis on the effects of social and political 
institutions on economic behaviour and the salience of norms and values, 
these two areas of investigation saw the rationalist discourse in IPE in the 
USA, widened.   
 
These developments illustrate the impact of differing intellectual traditions on 
how students of IPE practice their craft.  The boundary between the domestic 
and the international was never as sharply painted in Europe as it was in the 
US.  Similarly, the distinction between the material world and the world of 
ideas was never as discrete.  By their own admission (see Katzenstein et al, 
1998: 674) the concentration on method rather than substantive issues 
caused US scholars of IPE, for a long time, to miss the importance of the 
identities of actors and the norms that drove policy thinking.  US IPE is now 
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attempting to address this lacuna by bolting on constructivist thinking to its 
rationalist method.  It does so not to demolish rationalist understandings of 
actor behaviour but to modify and contextualise them (see Goodin and Tilly, 
2006).  This is acceptable to US scholarship in a manner that post modernism 
never was.  
 
 
(2) Explaining the emergence of IPE:  
(i) Globalisation and IPE 
Throughout much of the 20th century IPE had long been thought of as a 
secondary dimension of IR as both scholarship and practice.  This was 
especially the case in the early stages of the post world war two era when the 
dangers of nuclear war the driving force of IR.  But from the 1970s  IPE was 
no longer seen simply as international economic relations concerned with 
trade and finance, and often disparagingly refereed to as 'low politics' when 
contrasted with the high politics of diplomacy and security.  The situation 
changed at both scholarly and policy levels.  While it is not always easy to 
separate the primary from the secondary influence in the relationship between 
scholarship and policy, it was policy change that drove scholarly study rather 
than the other way around.   
 
To be specific, the onset of ‘globalization’, for all its faddishness, was 
important in alerting the wider community to the salience of IPE.  The search 
for international competitiveness, and the recognition that national policy 
autonomy may have been circumscribed by the changing relationship 
between state authority and market power in an era of deregulation, elevated 
IPE from a sub branch of IR.  Nowadays, IPE, perhaps more than any other 
area of IR, has the greatest correspondence between its growth as an area of 
study and the growing impact of globalization.  
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There are, of course, many ways to understand globalization (the most over 
used and under specified international concept of the post Cold War era).   
For students of IPE two ways of understanding are most important—
globalization as both a set of structures and as a set of complex and 
contingent processes that lack uniformity and that may be moving in a secular 
direction over time (Rosenau, 1997).  The argument of the modern scholar of 
IPE (irrespective of the particular methodological church to which they belong) 
is that the analytical fiction of the separation of politics and economics is 
unsustainable under conditions of globalization.   When we talk of the 
international (or for some ‘global’) political economy we are thinking of those 
domains of international activity in which the behaviour of markets—as the 
providers of finance, services and goods (now in that order of priority)—is a 
major form of global activity.   
 
In this context IPE is more interested in the activities of the 'competition state' 
(Cerny, 1997) than the 'security state'. IPE focuses on the changing 
relationship between state authority and market power and the role of non 
state and inter-governmental actors (especially MNCs, international financial 
institutions and the large NGOs) in this relationship.  IPE as a field of inquiry 
treats the boundaries between the international and the domestic and the 
economic and the political as porous.  Yet the basic unit of activity and policy 
is still the national economy and, if we want to be simple minded, in many 
ways, the international economy is, in formal empirical terms, still little more 
than the sum of all inter-state or trans-border economic activity.   
 
Also in a formal sense it is still states that negotiate treaties and international 
agreements and create international institutions.  This is the most obvious way 
of thinking about international economic relations, but it is also a static 
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understanding of what is now a much more dynamic set of processes in which 
the relationship between state activity and the activity of markets and non 
state actors is changing.   It is limited in other ways too that have become 
increasingly apparent over recent years.  This static analysis offered us no 
way to understand the evolving normative questions concerning the impact, or 
potential impact of globalisation on persons (individuals or populations) that is 
becoming the concern of political philosophers interested in global issues (and 
is addressed in section three.)  
 
We need to go beyond this simple formulation under conditions of 
globalization.  A model of understanding that identified the ‘politics of 
international economic relations’ (PIER) (see Spero, 1981) reflecting a state 
centric world may have pertained for most of the period since the inception of 
the Westphalian system, but it is clearly under challenge.  While there are 
continuities, there are also dramatic changes in train that are better captured 
by an understanding of IPE, reflective of a more globalized world in which the 
autonomy of states is diminished by global economic interdependence.  This 
reflects the increasing importance of the economic dimension of international 
relations and the political dimension of economic relations.  
 
While the 'PIER to IPE' metaphor offers an insight into changed thinking, it is 
but a heuristic device.  Both positions are somewhat caricatured and more 
nuanced than assumed.  IPE has a focus on the international system and the 
manner in which that system interacts with the domestic political economy.  
The key factor in the shift from PIER to IPE has been a recognition of the 
impact of ‘structural power’ in international economic relations; especially the 
emergence of a global division of labour and the demand for, and the 
provision of, credit and knowledge increasingly at the global as opposed to the 
national level (see Strange, 1988).  
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Economic analysis (and realist analysis in IR) had all too often ignored 
structural, as opposed to relational power.  In part this is because of the 
illusive nature of the concept.  In a relationship between A and B, it is 
empirically possible to determine who has power over whom.  Structural 
power is more difficult to determine since it is embedded in structures of 
knowledge, production, finance and security.   While we might intuitively 
understand how structural power embeds asymmetrical relationships that 
privilege some actors (state and non state alike) at the expense of others, it is 
not easy to identify or analyse these processes in a quantitative manner.  
Observations of structural power in action are invariably qualitative and 
discursive.  But we understand more fully nowadays how the structural power 
of markets has increased at the expense of the relational power of states.   
 
To the dimensions of structural power we must also add the impact of the 
communications revolutions of the 1990s.  This has increased not only the 
speed of communication, but also the number of actors involved in the 
deliberation of international economic policy.  It has seen the widening of the 
global economic policy agenda from a 'technical' one (concerned with 
enhancing efficiency in the global delivery of goods and services via the 
liberalisation of trade, privatisation of erstwhile state owned assets and the 
deregulation of finance) to a highly political one in which normative issues of 
accountability and legitimacy have also become salient; hence the need for 
increasing intellectual interactions between IPE and philosophy. 
 
While the increasing importance of normative issues is a theoretical move, it is 
predicated on the hard narrative of the last quarter of the 20th century that we 
now ubiquitously refer to as the era of globalisation.  During this period, and 
especially the 1990s) the impact of the increasing de-regulation and volatility 
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of the global financial markets, the growing politicisation of the international 
trade regime (especially since the creation of the WTO in 1995) and the 
increased questioning of the economic utility and political legitimacy of the 
international financial institutions as vehicles for financial stability (the IMF) 
and development (the World Bank) as North-South issues reappeared on the 
international political agenda (see Wade 2006), has enhanced the importance 
of a normative turn in IPE.  
 
With the passage of time the material changes associated with globalization 
have begun to unravel the distinctive resolution of political and social functions 
(especially the provision of collective goods) achieved by the sovereign state.  
If one main aim of the post world war two liberal international order was to 
domesticate the international economy, globalization has changed this.  The 
embedded liberal compromise that underwrote post World War two state-
society relations and the 'Bretton Woods' global economic order has passed.  
If domestic and international politics became embedded and intertwined in the 
post-WWII global system, and states were the sites of a trade-off to cushion 
domestic society against external pressures, this is now less the case 
(compare Ruggie, 1982 and 1995).    
 
Globalization, especially the urge for free markets and small government has 
altered the relationship between insiders and outsiders, between citizens and 
the state and between the state and the global order.  As economic de-
regulation and de-nationalisation have proceeded it has become difficult for 
states to manage the domestic-international trade-off in a way that satisfies 
competing demands on it (Rodrik, 1998). The demand for free markets and 
the declining compensatory domestic welfare mechanisms, when pursued in 
combination, are a potent cocktail leading to radical responses from the 
dispossessed.  Liberalisation may enhance aggregate welfare over all but it 
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does not solve the ‘political’ problem.  Securing domestic political support for 
the liberalisation of the global economy requires more than just the assertion 
of its economic virtue.  It also requires legitimacy.   
 
Under conditions of globalization, the legitimation question must now be 
addressed not only within, but also beyond the boundaries of the state.  At a 
normative level IPE is the intellectual site at which students of the economics 
of globalization and the international politics of legitimacy must interact.  What 
we are seeing, as section three will demonstrate, is an attempt to upscale a 
debate that has to-date only previously been conducted within modern 
developed states, not at the global level. 
 
Of course, it is not appropriate to assume that most countries are integrated 
into global markets in a uniform manner.  There are massive difference in the 
degree and speed with which any such integration takes place and automatic 
expectations of the continued advance of globalization as rational and 
rationalist activity--especially defined as economic liberalisation--should not be 
assumed. The existence of such variation does not lend itself to easy 
generalisation.  It is this complexity of analytical understanding with which 
students of IPE struggle.  For sure, there are important historical continuities 
with the past (O'Rourke and Williamson, 1999) but globalization, 
notwithstanding some continuity, does represent a new historical phase. This 
newness is to be found in the simultaneity of change in a range of economic 
phenomena such as trade liberalisation, the deregulation and integration of 
capital markets, the privatisation of national assets, the retreat of state 
functions (welfare ones especially), the diffusion of technology and the cross-
national distribution of production and foreign direct investment.   
 
But this argument (the Strong Globalization Theses, SGT) of the 1990s (see 
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Ohmae1990; Friedman 1999 and Luttwak, 1998) implying the end of the 
nation state and convergence of macroeconomic policy around an Anglo-US 
style neo-liberal model—was overstated.  States still have substantial national 
regulatory assets and capacity (Wade, 1996 and Zysman, 1996).   Indeed, no 
explanation of globalisation is sufficient without an understanding of the way in 
which states, especially the USA and the UK (Helleiner, 1995) have embraced 
and fostered it and in so doing have undergone processes of adaptation 
within a linked dynamic economic system and inter-state system.  In some 
states certain policy instruments, particularly those associated with 
macroeconomic adjustment strategies, may be enfeebled by globalization, but 
others, such as those related to industrial policy for example do change in a 
number of creative ways (Weiss, 1998). 
 
 
 
(ii) The Intellectual Origins of International Political Economy 
The last section demonstrated the manner in which international political 
economy had grown in salience as a scholarly pursuit as a response to the 
growth of inter-international economic interdependence and what we now call 
globalisation.  To this extent it has been ‘policy driven’. But to privilege a 
policy focus at the expense of other variables would be a mistake; especially if 
we wish to understand the normative turn in IPE (and indeed IR in general) 
over the last decade or so.   It is also an assumption of this essay that some 
insight into the intellectual origins of IPE—especially its relationship to our 
theoretical understanding of the state on the one hand and the 
epistemological and methodological questions that exercise the minds of 
scholars of IPE on the other—will be of greater interest for a Companion to 
Contemporary Political Philosophy than the more overt policy related issues 
that drive IPE.  
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Given the Westphalian understanding of sovereignty that prevailed in much 
scholarship on the international throughout the twentieth century (see Walker, 
1993 and Spruyt, 1994)—with the state as the primary subject of modern 
international relations—the management of the national economy was a 
crucial function of the state.  Thus, at the heart of the study of political 
economy were competing accounts of how states should govern their 
economies; especially the extent to which governments should intervene in 
and regulate economic activity.  Despite ideological and normative 
differences, there has been a historical tendency within liberal and non-liberal 
traditions alike to treat national economies as discrete systems of social 
organisation more or less delimited by the state’s territorial boundaries.  
Economies were conceived as self-contained, self-regulating systems of 
exchange and production.  This was as true for liberals such as Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo as it was for economic nationalists/mercantilists like Franz 
List and Alexander Hamilton.   
 
These thinkers were not blind to how economic activity commonly spilled over 
national frontiers.  Indeed the theory of comparative advantage required cross 
border trade, but they treated national economies as self-contained units in 
the international market.  The economy served the community of the state in 
which it was embedded; and its functions and benefits were defined via the 
interests of a given political society.  States monopolised the right to raise 
taxes within their boundaries thus enhancing the correlation of the economy 
with the state.  One of the general functions of the state therefore was to 
govern the economy to promote the wealth and welfare of the community.  
The relationship between wealth and power, or indeed power and wealth, was 
long well understood, as was the salience of foreign trade as an instrument of 
state power (Hirschman, 1945 and Viner, 1948).  For liberals and mercantilists 
alike, the market mechanism came to be seen as the surest and most efficient 
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means of ensuring the liberty, security and prosperity of both individuals and 
the community; the difference between them was not over the basic market 
mechanisms, rather than the degree to which governments would emphasise 
regulation and manipulation of economic activity to best satisfy community 
needs. 
 
In this historical context, most social science started out as political economy.  
But, from the time of the marginalist revolution in economics in the second half 
of the 19th century, economics as a discipline came to believe that its mode of 
analytical reasoning would allow it to exist separately from the other social 
sciences (Heilbroner and Milberg, 1995).  From that time, political economy 
developed as a theory of choice under constraint in which economics became 
‘a way of acting’ and politics ‘a place to act' (Caporaso and Levine, 1992: 32).  
Once the bifurcation was established economics and political science went 
their separate ways throughout the 20th century.  As a consequence, political 
science (and also sociology) matured as separate disciplines.  In the context 
of the times each, respectively, became grounded in the study of national 
economies, national polities or national societies.   
 
But internationalisation, and subsequently globalization, has shattered the 
distinction between the domestic and international (on which international 
relations as a new 20th century social science discipline had been built). It also 
poses serious and continuing questions about the utility of analyses that focus 
exclusively, or even predominantly, on discrete economic, political or social 
explanations of complex trans-national phenomena.  Or this in theory should 
be the case.  But most social scientists still feel more comfortable working 
within 'national' or ‘statist’ methodological paradigms.   
 
What is needed to cope with globalization is a readiness to tear down 
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intellectual barriers and bring together approaches, methods and disciplines 
which for too long have been set apart.  We have to explain the relationship 
between an increasingly non-territorial and globalized economic system on 
the one hand and the continued existence of a territorially delimited 
hierarchical system of states on the other.  No one set of disciplinary lenses 
has the capacity to do this.  We must, borrowing a phrase from Albert 
Hirschmann (1977), go 'trespassing'.  With honourable exceptions, this is not 
something social scientists are usually willing to do, especially in the United 
States where scholarly divisions of labour are stronger and methodological 
battles more fiercely contested, than in other parts of the world (Cohn, 1999).   
 
(iii) IPE as a Methodological Competition 
Methodological competition in the social sciences has invariably turned 
around what we might call the deductive-inductive divide. This divide is 
illustrated in the absence of discussions between the economist on the one 
hand and the scholar of government and politics (sometimes uneasily called 
‘political scientists’) on the other throughout most of the 20th century.  In crude 
terms, the deductive economist saw themselves as rationalist guided 
scientists, if not formalizing laws then at least presenting intuitive propositions 
that could then be modeled and tested.  On the other hand, inductivist 
students of politics, through a process of experiential inferential observation, 
would gradually build up knowledge of the real world.  Skepticism as to the 
identification of law like properties in social knowledge was always present in 
this approach.  By contrast, our deductivist economist would resist the 
possibility of laws of any kind emerging from mere processes of observation 
and inference.   
 
Throughout the 20th century these methodologies have been in competition; 
neither, of course, is without weakness.  It is clear, however, that the 
deductivist rationalism of the economist has fared professionally much better 
than the inductivist inferential and empiricist approaches of the student of 
politics throughout most of the last century and indeed, has extended its 
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influence into other social science disciplines, including political science and 
international political economy over the last quarter of the 20th century.  
Indeed, there is bibliometric evidence to demonstrate that political scientists 
(and sociologists) read more widely outside of their discipline than 
economists, who rarely do and are, often uncomfortable even within the core 
of economics and comfortable only in their own sub-disciplinary (see Frey and 
Eichenberger, 1997)   
  
The dominant mode of policy thinking in the economics discipline advances 
economic liberalisation as progress.  It is in part for this reason that modern 
neo-classical economic theory has been globalisation’s intellectual hand-
maiden. Resistance, critique even, can be seen as anti-progressive.  With 
methodological individualism and the notion of equilibrium as core tools, 
economic theory’s subsequent influence over public policy has been largely 
unchallenged.  In the late 20th century, economics became not only the study 
of the material world but also the 'approach' to studying wider elements of the 
socio-political world.  In the search for scientific scholarship political economy 
became the application of economic analysis to the various arenas of politics 
(domestic and international) (Caporaso and Levine, 1992: 31).  
 
To the extent that political economy (and IPE) became a site at which the 
social sciences met, if this happened, it was invariably on the terms of the 
dominant actor--to wit the economics discipline.  At one level, this is maybe 
how it should be.  The central concerns of economics—material production, 
distribution and exchange—are the central activities of life.  Indeed, most 
social sciences started out as political economy until economists came to 
believe that their modes of analysis could exist as some kind of disembodied 
study and disciplinary specialisation began to take over.  Points of contact 
only really began to re-emerge over the closing decades of the 20th century as 
other social sciences recognised on the one hand that they needed to take on 
board economic method in order to become 'scientific' and on the other, 
because some economists felt that they wished to, and could, colonise the 
issues areas of 'social' and 'political' life, traditionally the preserve of 
sociologists and political scientists (see Fine, 1998). Particularly relevant here 
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was the manner in which rationalist, especially game theoretic analytical 
models, developed within economics, lent themselves to the interest of the 
IPE scholar in collective action problem solving and institutional economic 
policy coordination at the international level.  
 
For many economists of a colonising bent, economics became not so much 
the study of the economic material world as much as ‘the approach' for 
studying wider elements of the socio political world.  As Barry Eichengreen 
(1998:993) noted: 
 
Economists are notorious for their intellectual imperialism, feeling 
no compunction about applying their kit of tools to everything from 
dental hygiene to nuclear war.  It is hardly a stretch, therefore, to 
adopt economics as a perspective from which to view international 
relations.   
 
This colonising behaviour of economics progressed in a threefold manner:  
(i) by treating non economic relationships as though they were in 
fact 'market relationships' of one sort or another;  
(ii) by defining the 'social' and the 'political' as though the were 
but the sum total of aggregated individual acts; in short to 
analyse the utility maximising behaviour of actors in a given 
domain; 
(iii) and, by stressing the importance of  the equilibrium 
 
‘The equilibrium’ is for economists is less  the securing of settled mutual 
adjustment rather than a belief that change in economic systems (especially 
of prices) will overtime inevitably result in convergenced on a common point.  
Actor convergence would be achieved through the pursuit of self-interest and 
notwithstanding the constraints under which they might operate.  By contrast, 
disciplines such as IR used the language of differentiation, anarchy and path 
dependence, rather than convergence, as their organising principles beyond 
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the confines of the state.  This difference, until rational choice theory gained 
hegemonic status in American political science (see Cohn, 1999) (and, albeit 
more slowly, by extension in international relations and IPE in the USA) was a 
reflection of the opposing modes of reasoning present in economics on the 
one hand and international relations (and most social sciences other than 
economics) on the other.   
 
Some branches of political science—especially the development of the theory 
of collective action (Olson, 1965 and 1982)—have aided and abetted the 
economics discipline in its imperial quest.  Economics largely ignores politics.  
But politics destablises, and indeed influences, equilibrium outcomes more 
than rationalist driven economic theory is prepared to concede. This is clearly 
the case with path dependency, and the observation of difference rather than 
the identification of patterned behaviour.  Path dependence creates a series 
of ‘lock in effects’ that limit alternative choices of action.  The singularity of 
rationality in decision-making is thus contaminated and constrained.   
 
Ironically, with its seeming inexorable inability to secure equilibrium outcomes, 
political science (and by extension IPE)—rather than economics—is in fact, as 
a leading rational choice theorist in political science has noted more ‘the 
dismal science’ than economics (Riker, 1980: 443).  Indeed, the practice of 
‘politics’ is the practical outcome of an inability to reach rationally determined 
equilibrium.  It is the complexity in the strategic relationships between actors 
and the ensuing fragility of politics in the study of particular historical events 
that can render much rational choice theory, with its desire for formalisation, 
problematic.   
 
Such an argument would likely be dismissed in the higher reaches of 
rationalist theory as a defence of adhocery in the other social sciences which 
are weak because they assume instability, unpredictability and difference of 
activity rather than patterned behaviour.  Thus for economists, political 
economy is not an inclusive research activity or field of inquiry, but a 
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methodology--the use of rational choice in economics.  As one leading 
student of the historiography of economics argues:   
 
'Political economy, as the term has come to be used today, is a 
broad discipline that studies the interface between economics and 
politics, using the method of rational choice theory'  (Basu, 2003: 1; 
my emphasis.) 
  
In the 'economic approach' anything not predictable or contributing to a 
pattern is taken to be exogenous.   IR scholarship Eichengreen argues (1998: 
1012) ' … needs to move in the direction of formulating parsimonious models 
and clearly refutable null hypotheses, and towards developing empirical 
techniques that will allow hypotheses to be more directly confronted by the 
data'.   In his now classic defense of deductive rationalist method and critique 
of inductive reflexivism in international relations and IPE Robert Keohane, 
(1988: 382) insisted on the need to focus full square on 'substantive 
rationality', if we are to avoid '...diversionary philosophical construction.'  In a 
North American context Keohane’s view has clearly prevailed.  The test of 
good IPE is largely the degree to which the IR scholar can learn and handle 
the tools of rationalist method found within economics.  In so doing, it has 
made IPE the handmaid of the intellectual hegemony of economics (see 
Martin and Simmons 1998 and Milner, 1998).   
 
Rationalist theory may be hegemonic in North American IPE, but there are 
currents in IPE that have not been equally seduced or suborned, especially 
across the Atlantic, where modes of reasoning of a non-deductive nature 
remain attractive and where assumptions that patterns in everyday events, 
and the mechanisms that underlie them, can also be inferred on the basis of 
historical observation.  This is not I should stress, to reject deductive 
rationalist theory.  It is increasingly important, for example, in understanding 
the behaviour of institutions as agents of collective action problem solving.  
But for many scholars of IPE, traditional narrative approaches of an inductive 
nature—what Dahl (1962: 101-04) long ago referred to as empirical theory in 
political science—remain centrally important.  They do so for three reasons. 
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First, empirical theorizing allows us to look at both persistence and change in 
values and practices over time.  It is especially an invaluable approach to 
adopt when working at the interface of international and comparative political 
economy.  Narrative approaches concentrate on processes and anchor 
research in historical perspective.  The language changes but very often the 
issues, questions and agendas remain directly similar in substance.  Second, 
an inductive experiential narrative approach, in contrast to a deductive 
approach, finds it easier to identify path dependence and sequencing.  Third, 
a narrative approach/ empirical theory in IPE has assisted institutionalism and 
history to reassert themselves in the closing stages of the 20th century after a 
period in which both were marginalised in favour of social ‘science’, narrowly 
defined as validity and falsifiability, during the late 1950s through early 1970s 
(see Apter, 2002: 256). Without history international relations (and IPE) 
cannot identify the kinds of patterns of which they are so fond. Narrative (and 
also inter-textual) methodologies allow us to address broader issues of 
language and meaning and an ability to bring these to bear in empirical 
contexts. 
 
What I have offered is not simply a critique of rationalism.  Rather I am 
suggesting a genuine contest among concerned scholars as to where the core 
of IPE as an approach to study might lie and where the boundaries of the 
discipline might be.  It is not clear cut.  Borders are leaky.  No one set of 
disciplinary lenses has the capacity to cope with globalisation. To paraphrase 
Alexis de Tocqueville, we need a ‘new science for a new world’.  In this new 
world we have to explain the relationship between an increasingly non-
territorial and globalised economic system on the one hand and the continued 
existence of a territorially delimited hierarchical system of states on the other.  
But at the end of the 20th century, much social science, and economics in 
particular, despite a growing rhetoric about the importance of multi-
disciplinarity, remained largely bounded by their own intellectual and political 
histories.   
 
Lest those of a strident non-positivist persuasion should feel comforted by the 
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preceding critique of rationality let me suggest that greater critical charges 
may be levelled at much work located within the post-modern turn in IR.  Just 
as the language and style of economics, in the name of scientific advance and 
speciality hides the simplicity, and at times untenable nature of some of its 
most basic working assumptions (see Sen, 1997) so too the language of the 
discursive theorist can, and often does, obfuscate serious understanding of 
the manner in which the global political economy—especially in its material 
manifestations—functions.   
 
The difference between these two extremes of activity is that economists have 
succeeded in bringing abstractionism into the mainstream of social scientific 
life—especially in the establishment of the scientific status of the concept of 
'equilibrium' from which, '...the real world is understood as a deviation' and in 
which the theoretical importance of the rationality of methodological 
individualism and the aggregated outcome of individual behaviour, becomes 
central.  In this regard the aim of economics is to explain as much '... as 
possible by as little as possible' (Fine, 1998: 50).  In this mode of thinking, 
economics is not just about market relations and/or material provisioning, but 
also calculation using rational choice theory to allocate preferences for welfare 
maximisation in the international economy.   
 
Let me be clear here; to be critical of this often over eager and sometimes 
slavish mimicking of economic method by other social science is not to deny 
the importance of what economists do well.  They understand the technical 
dynamics of global markets, no trivial matter.  Scholars of international 
relations do not.  But economics is invariably deficient in, or reluctant to 
accept, the normative implications of much of their work.  This is especially so 
when removed from 'developed world' contexts and what I call the 
‘parochialism of the present’. Historical and wider spatial (especially 
developing country) contexts find more sympathetic treatment, or recognition, 
in IPE. 
 
But economics and the 'economic approach' perform another function 
unmatched by any of other social sciences.  Modelling the market, and more 
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importantly, securing the transformation of capitalism into a more precise and 
neutral representation via scholarly models has given economics a seemingly 
detached authority within politics and the global decision making processes.  
The rhetoric of 'the market' is, for most people, less contentious than the 
rhetoric of 'capitalism'.  The appeal to expert economic knowledge as a source 
of policy advice, at the IMF or the World Bank for example (see Stone, 2000) 
is an appeal to ideologically neutralised or sensitised rhetoric.  But behind this 
scholarly and theoretical detachment is to be found the power of institutions 
that economic theorists have not been loath to use.  
 
This obsession with scientism has minimised the ability or willingness much 
(North American) IPE to make an important normative contribution to IR.  It 
has also meant that many normative IR theorists, as opposed to scholars of 
IPE, have cultivated a studious ignorance of the 'economic'.  To put it bluntly, 
most ‘theorists’ of IR are scared of economists. They refuse to engage them; 
preferring to stay engrossed in their own discursive world.  Inter-paradigm 
debates have flourished in IR over recent decades, but in their aversion of the 
'economic', they have represented thin gruel in the wider intellectual and 
policy communities.  It is all very well to want to debate the 'political' and the 
'post-political', but just as economists are guilty of ‘de-politicisation’, scholars 
of IR are equally as guilty of failing to address the centrality of the 'economic' 
under conditions of globalisation.   
 
Equally, the willingness of the other social sciences to be intimidated has left 
the way clear to economists in most policy fields, and the international domain 
under conditions of globalisation, in particular.  While scholars of IR have 
preoccupied themselves with epistemological and ontological questions, the 
economists have swept all before them.  This is where post modernism 
presents us with a paradox.  In providing (often plausible) reasons to question 
rationality driven 'economic science' post modernism has often tossed the 
baby out with the bath water.  In IR it has done so with a radical veneer, but 
one with no practical effect on 'real' issues of the 'international' such as 
poverty, exploitation and justice.  The theorist of international relations has 
preferred the role of heroic critic on the margin (pace Ashley and Walker, 
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1990) rather than to contest central policy issues of the day (Wallace, 1996.)  
 
It is in the context of IR’s failure to engage economics at either the scholarly or 
policy level that IPE becomes a radical and vital exercise. Neither economics 
nor political science, IPE is best seen as a ‘hosting metaphor’ to connote two 
accepted aspects of a field of inquiry.  Firstly, IPE is bounded by the 
exploration of the relationship between power and wealth.  Secondly, it sits at 
the interface of the study of international relations and economics and rejects 
the dichotomy that prevailed since the development throughout the 20th 
century.  
 
But without over estimating the current and still limited interaction between 
economics and political science, a rethink of this intellectual separation may 
be taking place. Globalization, and the communication revolutions that 
mobilizes it, has generated a set of questions that cannot be addressed 
simply from within a rationalist paradigm.  Nothing better illustrates this than 
the failure to provide a satisfactory 'rationalist' explanation for the increasingly 
volatility and herd like behaviour of financial markets, and the ensuing 
currency crises that occurred in East Asia, Latin America and Russia, under 
conditions of global deregulation at the end of the last century (Wade, 1988; 
Higgott and Phillips, 2000). 
 
(iv) A New International Political Economy?   
But, the intellectual news is not all bad.  A strand of scholarship is gradually 
emerging which transgress conventional social science boundaries on the one 
hand and/or resists the abstractionism of post modernism on the other (see 
for an early elaboration see Murphy and Tooze, 1991). This approach we 
could call a new political economy that attempts to combine the breadth of 
vision of the classical political economy of the mid-19th century with the 
analytical advances of 20th century social science (see Gamble, 2006; 
Watson, 2005 and the essays in Higgott and Payne 2000, for a flavour).  
Driven by a need to address the complex and often all embracing nature of 
the globalising urge, the methodology of the new political economy rejects the 
old dichotomies--between agency and structure, and states and markets--
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which fragmented classical political economy into separate disciplines.  The 
new political economy also resists Cox's (1981) initially useful but now limited 
analytical dichotomy between and IPE as ‘problem solving’ and IPE as ‘critical 
theory’.  The new political economy while not positivist—in the Popperian 
sense—is also not post-positivist, in a post modern sense and its normative 
assumptions are present, implicitly if not always explicitly. 
 
The new political economy's rejection of the anti-foundationalist fantasies of 
much post modernism does not lead it into the arms of the abstracted 
virtualism of contemporary high neo-classicism.  Rather it aspires to a hard-
headed material (real world) political economy that tries to explain how choice 
is affected by the social meanings of objects and actions.  Indeed, if there is 
one thing that the emerging processes of globalisation teach us, it is that 
mono-causal explanations of economic phenomena lack sufficient explanatory 
power.  Such a view holds increasing sway at the dawn of a new century.  
Moreover, it holds sway not just among Third World economic nationalists and 
academic critics of the neo-liberal economic and scholarly agenda but also 
within sections of the mainstream of the economics community (see inter alia, 
Rodrik, 1998; Krugman, 1999; Stiglitz, 1998 and 2002).   
 
This reformist scholarly tradition reflects a resistance to the often over stated 
virtues of parsimonious theorising for which the current globalised era offers 
little comfort (Hirschmann, 1986).  The new political economy operates from 
an assumption that what the marginalist revolution separated, globalisation is 
bringing together.  The new political economy is grounded in history and the 
'material' but with a critical policy bent.  That is a policy bent with a strong 
normative agenda of 'order';  but not an order that is simply a euphemism for 
the absence of open conflict and the presence of control, but an order 
underwritten by an impetus towards issues of enhancing justice and fairness 
under conditions of globalisation.  It is here that the new international political 
economy reaches out to philosophy. 
 
We are in a period of contest between the grand totalising narratives and 
theories of globalisation on the one hand and the specific history of various 
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actors and sites of resistance (be they states, classes, regions, or other 
localist forms of organisation) to this narrative on the other.  The new political 
economy eschews this dichotomy at the same time as it understands the 
importance of power in its structural as well as its relational form (see Strange, 
1988); and following Strange recognises the need to ask the important 
Lasswellian questions about power of the 'who gets what, when and how' 
variety.   The new political economy identifies a mix of values (security, 
wealth, freedom and justice) that affect the structures as well as the relations 
of power in the world economy (Strange, 1988: 18).   Implicit in the new 
political economy is a recognition that the maintenance and governance of the 
international economy is now as much a political question as the technical 
one. 
 
Indeed, when intellectual historians look back on this period, they may well 
recognise it as the era when practitioners began to think seriously for the first 
time about what the contours of global (economic) governance might look like.  
At the end of the twentieth century, collective action problem solving in 
international relations was couched in terms of effective governance, 
epitomised in what we now call the era of the Washington Consensus 
(Williamson, 1990).  It was rarely posed as a question of responsible 
governance.  Such questions may have been the big normative questions of 
political theory; but this was almost exclusively the political theory of the 
bounded state.  Most political theories of justice and representative 
governance assumed the presence of sovereignty.  Globalization has 
challenged these assumptions and is changing the global governance 
agenda.  But we should not fail to note, a political theory of global governance 
is in its infancy (see McGrew, 2001).   
 
If it had been politically expedient in international relations (as both theory and 
practice) to depoliticise issues of redistribution between rich and poor for 
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much of the post war era—by preserving the distinction between international 
economics and international politics as well as defining global governance 
largely as the efficient provision of a limited range of collective goods—this is 
no longer the case.  Political and ethical issues are increasingly front-loaded 
in North-South discussions.  For sure, the cruder versions of dependency 
theory, with their ‘southern’ structuralist critique of liberal economics (see Cox, 
1979 for a review) that prevailed on ‘the development question’ in the 1960s 
and 1970s have carried little influence into the 21st century.  But this is not to 
suggest that the asymmetrical economic divide between the North and the 
South has shown signs of disappearing from the international scholarly and 
policy agenda.  Similarly, other theories have regained a resonance in global 
policy communities too.  Indeed, mid 20th century theories of a distinctly 
mercantilist flavour pace Viner (1948) and concerned with questions of 
statecraft based on economic capabilities and asymmetries in the relationship 
between states, especially by the USA in the pursuit of its foreign policy post 
9/11/2001, have returned to fashion (Higgott, 2004).  In the absence of a 
stronger intervention into IPE by normative political philosophy than has been 
the case in the past they will flourish. 
 
3. The Demand for Political Philosophy in IPE 
IPE, while always carrying a set of normative assumptions around, has yet to 
develop at its core a sophisticated and consistent ethic of justice and fairness 
on the one hand and democracy (seen as representation, accountability and 
legitimacy) on the other.  Attempts to harness important work in political 
philosophy is in its infancy, rather in the way that philosophy’s ability to 
operate effectively beyond the level of the state is also in its infancy.  But from 
both perspectives an important trend is in train.  There is a change in 
intellectual fashion wrought by globalization, or more specifically by the 
challenges (what some would call the ‘backlash’) to globalisation that 
emerged in the late 20th/early 21st century.  This has occurred in two ways.  
Firstly, globalisation challenges some central tenets of economic theory as 
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both method and policy; especially with regards to the assumed relationship 
between enhanced aggregate economic growth and poverty alleviation.  
Secondly, it causes us to ask new questions about the impact of globalization 
on existing international economic governance structures; especially on 
ethical governmental and political processes.  In short, globalisation changes 
the way we think about two core concepts of the political philosophy of the 
modern state—justice and democracy.  
 
As is well known, the globalisation 'backlash' only really gathered its 
momentum when the currency flights from East Asia in 1997 decimated 
several so-called 'miracle' economies (Higgott, 2000).  The protests against a 
proposed Millennium Trade Round at Seattle in November 1999 have, since 
that time, ensured that the ethical debate about globalisation is now no longer 
a secondary discourse.  Seattle forced mainstream economic supporters of 
globalization (pace Bhagwati, 2004 and Wolf, 2004) for the first time, to realise 
that they had to justify the way the global economy was developing, rather 
than repeat the 'there is no alternative' mantra.  
 
The serious, long term ethical analysis of globalization had begun.  Pre-
globalisation assumptions that states steered national economies no longer 
hold in the way they once did.  Normative discussions about the limits to 
justice (especially questions of socioeconomic distribution) and democracy 
(especially representation and accountability) can no longer be conducted 
simply amongst national publics with national boundaries.  A Westphalian 
cartography assuming stable identities and clear lines of authority—usually a 
state—where justice can be realised cannot be axiomatically assumed.   
Under the influences of globalisation the boundaries of politics are unbundling 
and stable social bonds are deteriorating.   
 
It is no longer sufficient to focus simply on the just ordering of social relations 
within a given state to ensure the social bond between the citizens and the 
state is maintained (Devetak and Higgott, 1999).  Discussion has begun to 
move beyond statist paradigms; especially with the growing interest in the role 
of networks and other third sector actors in contemporary international 
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relations. Increasingly complex understandings of non state regulation and 
interaction across the policy spectrum exercise scholars of IPE, international 
relations and global public policy alike (see inter alia; see Reinecke, 1998; 
Braithwaite and Drahos, 2002; Keck and Sikkink, 1999; Risse, 2002; Sinclair, 
2000; Stone, 2002; and Slaughter, 2004.) 
 
The stuff of political philosophy remains largely unchanged, but the analytical 
framework changes.  The growth of globalisation and multi-level governance 
in a globalised world represents a major challenge for theories of democracy 
and global justice.  Justice, of course, is a complex and multidimensional term 
when applied in an international context.  This paper is concerned with justice 
in its economic (inequality and underdevelopment) and political (the global 
democratic deficit) guises but recognises other important dimensions to a 
theory of global justice; such as the environment and human and cultural 
rights (Shue, 1999 and Linklater, 1999.)  The political dimensions for the 
analysis of democracy and justice should reflect what Nancy Fraser (2005) 
calls a paradigm shift to a ‘post Westphalian theory of democratic justice’, 
where justice is seen as a ‘parity of participation’ and politics determines at 
which level the struggle for distributive justice is conducted.  This mode of 
philosophical reasoning clearly lends itself to the debates in IPE about the 
nature of representation that should prevail in, and indeed beyond, the 
institutions of global economic decision-making. 
 
IPE, in large part because of its 20th century location within IR scholarship, 
has tended to focus on the developed, the rich and the powerful of the North 
at the expense of the developing and the poor of the South.  But since the 
turn of the century, more and more scholars of IPE have begun to think about 
the underdeveloped and the poor as part of IPE though not (pace Phillips, 
2005) with any input from normative political thinkers on key issues such as 
inequality and justice.  But development issues, IPE and normative philosophy 
are coming closer together than in the past.  It is the growing importance of 
the development dimension of IPE that is demanding that normative 
philosophy play a larger role in explaining and advancing the nature of rights 
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and justice in constituencies and forums beyond the level of the national state 
and especially in developing country contexts.   
 
To illustrate, recent political philosophers— such as Charles Beitz, Amartya 
Sen and Thomas Pogge—have played a seminal role in opening up these 
discussions, basically discussions about the obligations of the rich to the poor, 
in the late 20th and early 21st century.  From a cosmopolitan perspective, and 
recognizing the increasingly interconnected contours and leaky boundaries of 
a globalizing world, Beitz (1979/2000 and 1999) has resisted Rawls (1999) 
more communitarian notions that distributive justice between societies was 
neither appropriate nor desirable.  Although this is not the place for a 
discussion of Rawls’s Law of Peoples (but see Martin and Reidy, 2006 and 
Brown, 2002) Pogge has made a plausible normative argument, if not 
practical case, that Rawls ‘difference principle’ in support of the least 
advantaged, could be extended beyond the confines of the constituent 
members of the modern state system;  
 
This line of argument has been taken further by Pogge (2001, 2002 and 2005) 
in his work on issues of justice, poverty and human rights and the challenge to 
the automatic entitlement of the affluent developed world.   Touching directly 
on core issues in IPE, Pogge demonstrates how environmental degradation 
and developing world poverty (especially famine) stand in a direct causal 
relationship with affluent developed world lifestyle excess.  Sen (1999) in his 
discussion of the importance of freedom, justice and responsibility in 
development, advances similar arguments to Pogge; although they would 
certainly disagree about the policy implications of their analyses.  Sen, 
showing his economic credentials, favours market solutions (real free trade) 
rather than Pogge’s welfarist approach which outlines a more interventionist, 
intricate redistributive set of tax proposals.  
 
Yet it remains from the point of view of the affluent Western developed states 
and their citizens that most IPE draws its mode of thinking for everyday life. 
For example, if we consider the contemporary global trade agenda, the 
contours of which are contested on a North-South basis, then neo-classical 
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economic trade theory privileges the norms of the dominant ‘abstracted 
rationality’.  But most developing country policy-makers privilege a norm of 
‘contextual rationality’ and the embedded political contexts of policy making 
(see Brint, 1994 and Lindblom, 1990 for a discussion of competing 
rationalities along these lines).  In policy terms this frequently leads to different 
positions that reinforce North-South divisions.  An unwillingness by many 
developing country policy makers to accept the precepts of abstracted 
rationality often means that their claims are not treated seriously in 
international decision making environments.   
 
In fact, as Arendt (1973:269-84) would have it, they often seem to lose ‘the 
right to have rights’ in these processes because the mode of reasoning they 
operate is not in conformity with abstracted rationality.   For much of the post 
World War II era, the abstracted rationality that under-pinned international 
economic decision making rendered the governance structures of the world 
economy immune from their (mainly Southern) critics, and hence resistant to a 
wider spread democratic control (see Cox, 1997).  Efforts to overcome 
injustice require a rebalancing of the relationship between abstracted and 
contextual rationality.  This is a task for the philosopher.  It may be a scholarly 
enterprise but it casts massive policy shadows.  We are unlikely to move 
many debates in IPE forward—especially of a North South development 
nature—without establishing contextual rationality as a legitimate policy norm. 
 
But competing rationalities are not the only issue determining the degree to 
which justice questions are heard in appropriate arenas.  By far the strongest 
determinant of inclusion and exclusion of the developing world in the global 
policy making process remains the asymmetrical structure of the state system.  
Notwithstanding recent assaults on it, the Westphalian state system remains 
the key factor in the institutionalisation of arenas for addressing justice 
questions and, despite recent and increasingly sophisticated cosmopolitan 
political theory (pace Held, 2005; Caney, 2005 and Dryzek, 2006) we have yet 
to establish an understanding of justice at the global level in a practically 
meaningful way.  Indeed, the real importance of cosmopolitan theory may be 
less as a means of institutional design for global governance per se than 
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(pace Habermas, 2001) as an ethical discourse or way of thinking within 
which to locate the discussion of governance beyond the state.  Indeed, its 
great strength is that it inserts ethics into the discussion of the global economy 
in a manner not present in much of the technical economic literature and 
analysis of the structures of global economic governance of the closing stages 
of the 20th century (see Brassett  and Higgott, 2003 and Brassett and Bulley, 
2006). 
 
As globalization has attenuated the hold of democratic communities over the 
policy making process within the territorial state, the language of democracy 
and justice has taken on a more important rhetorical role in a global context.  
As the nation state as a vehicle for democratic engagement has become 
problematic, the demand for democratic engagement at the global level has 
become stronger.  But this is of course difficult to secure.  The fair and 
democratic application of procedural rules in a world of asymmetrical states 
will always be difficult to secure.  This will continue to be the case 
notwithstanding the growing salience of other non state actors (NGOS, global 
social movements and other civil society actors) that now claim roles in global 
decision making processes (see Mathews, 1997; Lynch, 1998 and Florini, 
2003).   
 
Governance and Legitimacy in IPE 
The developments of wide spread civil society activity in the global domain 
have raised the stakes for the legitimacy of existing global economic 
governance structures which can no longer be justified in the way that they 
were for much of the post world war two era.  In that period the understanding 
of governance that prevailed for the international economic institutions was 
one which saw them as effective and efficient deliverers of collective goods; 
what I call ‘global governance 1’ (GG1).  The instruments of governance 
(especially the International Financial Institutions) did not envisage a major 
role in the determination and allocation of the collective goods they provided 
by their recipients. Global governance was less a question of a theory of 
representation and accountability rather than a technical one of efficient 
allocation.   
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Globalisation, and the growing demand for representation beyond the 
territorial state has changed this.  A multilateral economic institution such as 
the WTO needs to be not only an effective and efficient instrument of policy 
making beyond the territorial state (GG I) it also needs to diminish what is 
widely agreed to be a democratic deficit that arises from the two speed 
process of the rapid globalisation of the world economy on the one hand and 
the much slower globalisation of the global polity on the other.   It needs a 
theory of global governance with a focus on the provision of representation, 
accountability and justice—what we might call global governance II (GGII). 
 
Of course, whether existing multilateral institutions can, or should, play the 
major role in bridging the gap between GGI and GGII is an increasingly moot 
point in the early 21st century.  That they should underwrite and enhance 
cooperation in the interests of all participants in an accountable and 
transparent manner, and provide problem-solving strategies for new stresses 
on the system as they emerge, seems a fairly unproblematic assertion.  But 
because power asymmetries rather than procedural fairness remain the key to 
explaining outcomes in institutions like the WTO, especially in the negotiations 
process it, like other institutions, is seen by many as less a vehicle for the 
delivery of ‘global public goods’ rather than what might best be seen as ‘club 
goods’ serving interests in the developed world first.   The failure of the Doha 
round of multilateral trade negotiations in 2006 occurred in part because the 
world’s poor are becoming increasingly resistant to what they see as sub-
optimal and asymmetrical deals imposed by the world’s rich. The relationship 
between rule makers and rule takers is changing.  Those affected by the 
decisions taken in global economic institutions are increasingly vocalising their 
assumptions that they should have a right to participate in making them. 
 
Thus the next step must be the enhancement of GGII.  These steps may need 
to be modest. They will certainly not appeal to the radical transformationalists 
of the anti-globalisation movements (see for example www.globalsouth.org) 
nor will they deliver an ideal type global democracy (with universalist 
participation) predicated on the globalising of the ‘domestic democratic 
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analogy’ present in much cosmopolitan political theory (such as Held, 2005). 
Rather, and more modestly, it might make more sense to improve our ability 
to enhance, and in some instances consolidate, existing or nascent patterns 
of accountability as a route to legitimacy.  There are no serious 
institutionalised system of checks and balances at the global level.  And, as 
we have seen in the 21st century, those institutional constraints that do exist 
have little purchase on the behaviour of major powers, especially a hegemon, 
should they choose to ignore them.  Thus the problems we have to address if 
we are to enhance GGII are:  
• How do we disaggregate the notions of democracy and accountability?  
That is, can we identify some principles of accountability that do not 
necessarily emanate from an essentially liberal, western ‘domestic’ 
theory of democracy? 
• How do we, can we, separate the notion of legitimacy from 
accountability?  
• Put as a question, is it possible to think about global accountability 
when there is no global democracy? 
While being ‘accountable’ assumes the presence of ‘norms of legitimacy’, this 
is not the same as being democratic.  In much contemporary analysis of 
global governance, democracy and accountability have, all too often and all 
too wrongly, been conflated.  In the context of a given state, direct democracy, 
with full participation, is held up as the ideal type of representative 
government (see Dahl, 1999).   Global governance is never going to 
approximate this ideal type.  Theorists of global governance need to think of a 
situation that, while sub-optimal to this ideal type, nevertheless makes 
provision for a meaningful degree of accountability.  Grant and Keohane 
(2005) offer us two basic kinds of accountability—accountability as 
participation and accountability as delegation. 
In theory, institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank are accountable to 
the governments that have created them and, in an widening participatory 
mode, to the developing countries they aim to assist.  It is in this second 
sense, with the implications of the empowerment of traditionally weaker 
actors, that accountability as participation and representation, and by 
extension democracy, is often conflated and confused.  It is this confusion 
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that, often wrongly, leads us to challenge the legitimacy of the international 
institutions.  Can they be legitimate, and in part accountable, without 
necessarily being democratic by the yardstick of the ‘domestic analogy’? 
The rhetoric of illegitimacy has become increasingly powerful in the hands of 
the anti-globalisation movements (and also with the increasingly strident 
economic nationalists in the USA we might add).  This is especially the case 
in the context of the multilateral trade regime.  In many ways the international 
institutions are indeed accountable, and often more accountable than many of 
the NGOs that criticise them.  But they are not accountable in a way that 
satisfies those who equate legitimacy with democratic theory underwritten by 
the domestic analogy.   
For GGII to be meaningful—by which I mean acceptable to a large group of 
principal actors in global politics and also reinforcing of GGI–-it has to 
understand the fundamental differences between the currently unrealisable 
conception of cosmopolitan global democratic governance on the one hand 
(the globalised domestic analogy), and systems of accountability that may not 
be fully democratic in the domestic sense, but that can have real political 
purchase in global public policy on the other.  Claims to ‘legitimacy’, or rather 
the absence of it, in global public policy are frequently a euphemism for the 
rejection by the weaker actors of the asymmetrical structure of power in the 
contemporary global order.  This is an unfortunate political reality and it is for 
this reason that developing countries have a strong preference for formalised, 
rule governed processes of decision making within an institution that has a 
specifically defined mission underwritten by judicial instruments rather than 
the informal less prescriptive and flexible approaches favoured by developed 
countries.  Where judicial instruments are not available other, often less 
effective, calculations must be brought to the fore, especially ‘global public 
opinion’ as articulated by increasingly influential non-state actors in civil 
society.    
Securing accountability is becoming increasingly complex as the certainties of 
a Westphalian order drift away.  For too long, and drawing on the domestic 
analogy, accountability has been equated with democratic accountability, 
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which in turn has been equated with widening participation.  In order to take 
GGII forward, we should not dream of instant and unattainable, global 
democracy but, as Grant and Keohane argue (2005) try ‘to figure out how to 
limit the abuse of power in a world with a wide variety of power-wielders and 
without a centralized government.’  As they go on to say, ‘if we focus on the 
conditions for the operation of a variety of accountability mechanisms rather 
then pure democratic accountability, we will see opportunities for feasible 
actions to improve accountability’.    
But to-date, there is little consensus on how to develop meaningful 
conceptions of accountability and representation that provide, or re-create, the 
necessary legitimacy for the international institutions that will be responsible 
for delivering global public goods to the world’s rule takers.  Institutional rule 
makers (from the developed world) tend to privilege GGI while rule takers 
(developing country government officials and civil society actors) tend to 
privilege GG II.  Thus the possible difference between success and failure in 
any negotiation between the rule makers and the rule takers will revolve 
around the degree to which the principles of justice and fairness underwrite 
any bargain.  While it may seem irrational to proponents of ‘abstracted 
rationality’,  ‘justice as process’ is every bit as important for the mostly 
developing world rule takers as is ‘justice as outcome’.  
Enhancing our capabilities in these areas should be at the core of a research 
agenda to enhance GGII.  This is not abstract political theorising.  Successful, 
albeit gradually enhanced, such activities will eventually cast massive policy 
shadows.  Without them the longer term legitimacy of the international 
economic institutions such as the WTO will come under greater challenge 
than is even the case in the early 21st century.  What the relationship between 
GGI and GGII reveals is the inseparable connection between justice, process 
and democracy at the global level as much as at the domestic.  GGI alone 
cannot deliver justice.  Political theorists have yet to find a feasible of way of 
linking GGI and GGII in the contemporary global order.   As Cecilia Albin 
(2001 and 2003) has demonstrated, ‘process’ questions are as important as 
‘outcome’ questions; procedural fairness is a necessary, if not sufficient, 
 40
condition to guarantee outcome fairness in multilateral trade negotiations.  
They are first order questions for the early 21st century at the interface of 
normative theory and IPE as practice 
Similarly, ‘Continental’ theories of action, especially communicative action and 
theories of deliberative democracy of the kind advanced by Habermas are 
also to be found in discussions of how to enhance the legitimacy of the 
decision making process within bodies like the WTO (Kapoor, 2005). 
Interestngly, international economic institutions in general are beginning to 
take seriously the potential utility of deliberative democracy as a way of 
revealing the manner in which they have traditionally operated primarily by the 
conventions of power politics delivering coerced decision making, false 
consensus and inequitable outcomes.  Enhanced deliberative democracy is 
being explored to as a way to mitigate power asymmetries and help secure a 
fairer bargaining process than, for example, currently exists within the context 
of multilateral trade negotiations.   
 
This section has tried to suggest that there are increasingly important linkages 
between IPE and some elements of contemporary normative political 
philosophy.  Specifically, discussions of globalisation—the substantive 
research core of contemporary IPE—have stirred normative scholarly interest 
how to combat global inequalities and develop a more just international order.   
The unequal distribution of wealth is central to the IPE-normative theory nexus 
and most contemporary analysis.  Similarly, this nexus assumes a strong 
connection between the search for a just international order and the need to 
overcome the democratic deficit in international relations.  Implicit in this 
relationship from an IPE perspective is the increasing interplay between the 
‘system of states’ and emerging global civil society.   
 
This interplay leads us to a major area of unsettled inquiry.  Will it lead to a 
more cosmopolitan form of international governance? Much cosmopolitan 
theory relies on institutional design to establish global governance with the 
best elements of GGI and GGII.  Yet this alone is not sufficient.  It has yet to 
find a way to harness in constructive manner those emerging social forces of 
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global civil society clamouring for enhanced global democracy.  In order that 
these forces do not simply default to being global interest groups requires that 
a ‘richer understanding of democracy be realized through the legal 
institutionalisation of free and equal access to a global public sphere’ 
(Bohman, 1999; but see also the essays in Ougaard and Higgott, 2002).  This 
is a question that requires new advances in both empirical and normative 
inquiry. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
‘International political theory stands in relation to the growth of 
the global political economy roughly where the political theory of 
the nation state stood in relation to the development of the 
modern industrial economy in the mid-nineteenth century. … It 
required most of a century for the political theory of the 
democratic state to catch up with political-economic change’ 
(Beitz, 1999: 515). 
 
This chapter has provided a synoptic insight into the scholarship of IPE.  As 
any review must inevitably be, it is partial.  But, conscious of the need to 
provide a companion to philosophy, it has tried to identify those elements of 
IPE which might be expected to be of interest to philosophers.  Hence its 
focus on the intellectual origins, contemporary modes of thought and 
methodological issues of contest that beset IPE as a field of inquiry.   This 
latter discussion has by no means been exhaustive.  Rather it has identified 
what might be thought of as a the bones of a research agenda for the early 
21st century in which both the normative theorist and the IPE scholar must be 
collectively, as opposed to separately, engaged.   This is the case, it has been 
argued, because the emerging global conversation about global (economic) 
governance needs to be understood not only as the pursuit of  effective and 
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efficient problem solving but also as a normative, indeed explicitly ethical 
approach to the advancement of a more just agenda of global economic 
management. 
 
Indeed, the central normative question of our time under conditions of 
globalisation—how do we enhance a more equitable system of distribution 
and ensure greater representation of those affected by economic globalisation 
when the necessary political institutional frameworks to negotiate distribution 
and representation are not agreed—is one that requires the skills of both the 
scholar of international political economy and the normative political theorist.  
As Beitz implies, there is a job to be done.  Let us hope that this too does not 
take ‘a century’. 
 
Further Readings 
 
The literature of IPE is voluminous as both a theoretical enterprise and as a 
series of issue specific policy areas.  A tour of the theoretical literature could 
start with the fiftieth anniversary edition of International Organisation 
(Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1998.) This edition reflects the 
predominant liberal-interdependence theoretical disposition in US IPE.  Gilpin 
(2001) is the quintessential realist statement in IPE; Cox, (1987) and Gill and 
Law (1998) remain the strongest Marxist elaboration of IPE and Strange 
(1998) offers the major non-Marxist stucturalist perspective.  Of the numerous 
‘readers’ in IPE/GPE that offer a selection of readings across this theoretical 
spectrum see inter alia, Stubbs and Underhill (2005); Ravenhill (2005); 
Frieden and Lake (2000); Crane and Amawi 1991 and Palan (2000).   
 
The centrality of globalisation to contemporary IPE is extensively explored by 
Cerny (1995); Stiglitz (2002); Scholte (2005) and in the various edited 
collections by Held (2005a), Held et al (1999), Held and McGraw (2002), 
Higgott and Payne (2000) and Kesselmaan, 2005. ‘Alter-globalisation’ views 
are reflected in the work of authors like Bello (2002); Dehesa (2006) and Civil 
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Society Organisations such as Focus on the Global South 
(http://focusweb.org)  and Third World Network (www.TWN.org).   
 
The increasingly important relationship between globalisation and global 
governance, now a central theme of IPE is explored inter alia in Held and 
McGrew (2000); Hewson and Sinclair (1999); Ougaard and Higgott (2002); 
Kahler and Lake (2003); Keohane (2002); Barnett and Duvall (2005); Grande 
and Pauly (2005) and Weiss (2003.)  Studies of key issues areas, looked at 
through IPE lenses, can be found in many of the general works listed above 
and in more specific works on trade and development (Chang, 2003; Stiglitz 
and Charlton, 2005); finance (Germain, 1997; Strange, 1998; Woods, 2006), 
regionalism (Katzenstein, 2005 and Breslin et al, 2002) and the international 
institutions (Diehl 2001; Ruggie, 1998 and Martin, 2006). 
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